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The State of Wyoming prides itself on the quality of its judiciary.
The process of selection and retention of judges is supposedly based
upon the merit of those judges. Yet research has cast some doubt
as to the validity of the judicial retention election as a means of
accurately evaluating merit, indicating that voters have little information about judicial competence. The authors of this article conducted
a study of Wyoming's 1978 judicial retention elections. They present
their findings concerning the amounts, sources and effects of information possessed by Wyoming voters in those elections, and offer suggestions for improvement of the judicial retention election system.

JUDICIAL MERIT RETENTION IN
WYOMING: AN ANALYSIS AND
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
by
Kenyon N. Griffin* and Michael J. Horan**

The selection and retention of judges under the Missouri
Plan has been one of the more significant developments in
the judicial process during the past quarter-century.1 The
plan itself or variations of it have been adopted for all or
some of the judges in at least 20 states as a substitute for
the election of judges. The attractiveness of the Missouri
Plan stems in part from what have been the perceived flaws
in the direct popular election of judges. A major problem
has been voter apathy in both partisan and non-partisan
judicial elections. Studies have shown that most voters are
poorly informed about candidates for judicial office and
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frequently cannot recall the names of persons for whom
they voted-if they even bothered to choose between judicial
candidates at all.
In partisan elections, it has been shown that the dominant source of information for voters regarding judicial
candidates is the party endorsement; this informational
source is followed by conversations with friends, the media,
and bar association recommendations.2 Non-partisan election
of judicial candidates, in contrast to partisan elections,
removes the formal political party influence, but not without dubious consequences. Without party endorsements, the
result is increased voter non-participation and the strengthening of the role of incumbency in electoral outcomes.' In
either case, the direct popular election of judges has been
a selection procedure permeated with apathy, ignorance,
and the impact of essentially irrelevant factors such as
partisanship or money."
The first ingredient of the Missouri Plan, "merit selection," confronts these problems by eliminating the initial
choice of judges by the voters and substituting instead a
procedure wherein it is felt expertise and wisdom will be
the dominant considerations. This procedure utilizes a judicial nominating panel of lawyers and non-lawyers to recruit
and nominate several individuals who are qualified to fill
a judicial vacancy. This fundamentally elitist procedure of
"merit selection" is balanced by providing for final selection
by the popularly elected chief executive of the state and,
subsequently, requiring voter approval after the newly appointed judge has served a probationary period on the bench.
2. Klots, The Selection of Judges and the Short Ballot, 88 J. AM. JuD. SOC'Y
134 (1955). See McKnight, Schaefer, & Johnson, Choosing Judges: Do
the Voters Know What They're Doing, 62 JUDICATURE 95 (1978); Brocksmith, Oklahoma Poll Shows Court Voters in the Dark, 50 JUDICATURE

134 (1966).
3. Winters & Allard, Judicial Selection and Tenure in the United States, in
THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAw ExPLosioN 158-59 (H. Jones ed.)
(1965). See also Jacob, Judicial Insulation--Elections,Direct Participation,
and Public Attention to the Courts in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 801,

806-808.
4. For a somewhat different estimate of the apathy problem in judicial
elections, see S. NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED JUDICIAL
SYSTEMS (1 American Politics Series 04-001, Sage Pubs. 1973); Dubois,
Voter Turnout in State Judicial Elections: An Analysis of the Tail on
the Electoral Kite, 41 J. PoL. 865 (1979).
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The second ingredient of the Missouri Plan, "merit
retention," provides the voters an opportunity to evaluate
a judge's record and qualifications and cast their ballots to
retain the judicial officer or to remove him or her from the
bench. In principle, the public's opportunity to participate
in merit retention election of judges is the ultimate check
on judicial accountability. Judges, not unlike members of
the legislative and executive branches of the government,
face the voters and the voters determine whether judicial
conduct and performance reflects the public interest.
Critics of this aspect of the Missouri Plan have argued
that merit retention elections are empty pretenses at maintaining popular accountability of judges. They argue that,
given the generally low visibility of judicial personnel and
issues, the absence of traditional party guidelines, and the
lack of personality clashes during election campaigns, the
voters have no way of making an informed decision about
the performance of a judge on the bench.' Inevitably, if one
follows these arguments, merit retention elections of judges
are nothing more than plebiscites guaranteeing the incumbent a top-heavy majority vote.
The linkage between the voters' knowledge of judges'
records and qualifications and their voting decisions in
merit retention elections is critical if popular accountability
of the courts is to be meaningful. The purpose of this
article is to examine this linkage, based upon analyses of
the results of the 1978 judicial retention elections in this
state as well as a survey of Wyoming voters conducted
the same year, and to discuss the implications and potential
policy alternatives of these findings within the context of
public accountability of judicial officials.
WYOMING'S

1978 JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS

Wyoming adopted the Missouri Plan for the appointment and retention of. state district court judges and su5. See Barnett, Observations on the Direct-ElectionMethod of Judicial Selection, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1098 (1966); Wormuth & Rich, Politics, the Bar, and
the Selection of Judges, 3 UTAH L. REv. 459 (1953).
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preme court justices in 1972.6 Appointments to the bench
are made by the governor from a list of three qualified
persons nominated by the Wyoming Judicial Nominating
Commission. Each judge or justice is then required to stand
for retention during the November general election after
the first year of service, and subsequently every six years
for judges and eight years for justices. The election is nonpartisan and non-competitive; the ballot question is: "Shall
be retained in office?" Unless
Judge
---------------one chooses to abstain, the only response the voter may give
is "yes"y or "no.")
Wyoming is divided into nine judicial districts served
by 15 state district court judges (see map). Seven districts
are multi-county units comprised of two, three or four
counties. In three of these districts, one judge serves the
entire area, while in four districts two judges serve. In
both types of districts, each judge has a "home" county
and travels to one or more counties within his jurisdiction.
The other two judicial districts in the state are single-county
units. Natrona and Laramie counties-the most populous
counties in Wyoming---comprise separate judicial districts
and each has two resident judges6 a
In 1978, five of the fifteen state district court judges
were required to stand for retention. The names of these
five judges were on the ballot in thirteen different counties;
included were both single and multi-county judicial districts.
The election results reveal, as shown in Table 1, that each
judge received overwhelming support for retention from
the voters. All five were retained, and an average of 79.5
percent of those voting on the retention question favored
retaining their state district court judge. In no district did
a judge receive less than 77 percent of the votes, though
support by county ranged from a high of 89.8 percent for
Judge George Sawyer in Goshen County to a low of 71.8
percent for Judge Paul Liamos in Campbell County.
6. WYO. CONST. art. 5, §4. The plan's provisions have also been extended by
law to county court judges in the state. WYo. STAT. §5-5-111 (Supp. 1979).
6a. By legislative action, one additional district court judge has been allotted
to the Sixth and to the Eighth Judicial Districts respectively, effective
July 1, 1980. 1980 WYo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 20, §§1, 3.
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TABLE 1
1978 JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS IN WYOMING
RETENTION
GENERAL
ELECTION
ELECTION
TOTALS
TOTALS
JUDGE
COUNTY %Yes
%No %Abstention Voting
Robert A. Hill
AIbany
79.0
21.0
24.8
9,895
Carbon*
83.0
17.0
25.3
6,000
T!OTALS
79.3
20.7
25.0
15,895
Paul T. Liamos, Jr. Campbell
71.8
28.2
11.1
4,834
Crook
1,973
87.3
12.7
12.5
eston*
80.0
20.0
12.7
2,518
T OTALS
77.2
22.8
11.8
9,325
R. M. Forrister
N atrona*
19,821
78.7
21.3
11.3
78.7
21.3
T OTALS
11.3
19,821
75.2
24.8
George P. Sawyer Converse
26.9
3,184
10.2
Goshen*
89.8
6.9
4,821
N iobrara
85.3
14.7
27.7
1,382
3,566
20.2
81.9
18.1
P latte
T OTALS
84.1
15.9
12,853
17.1
76.3
23.7
21.8
10,433
Robert B. Ranck F remont
22.6
S,ublette
77.4
14.3
1,849
3,909
83.7
16.3
7.5
eton*
T
T OTALS
78.4
21.6
17.5
16,191
WYOMING
SUMMARY

All Races

79.5

20.5

16.8

74,185

*District Court Judge's "home" county.
Source: Data furnished by the Secretary of State's Elections Office.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980
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Strong popular support for retaining the judges should
not, however, obscure another important finding from the
1978 election results. Comparison of the number of persons
voting in the general election and on the specific issue of
judicial retention reveals that an average of 16.8 percent
of the voters abstained on the retention question. The rate of
abstentions ranged from a low of 6.9 percent in Goshen
County, to a high of 27.7 percent in Niobrara County. Voter
abstention rates were typically lower in a judge's home
county than were the rates found statewide.
The results of Wyoming's judicial retention elections
were similar to the results of merit retention elections of
trial court judges across the nation.7 In 1978, 408 such
retention elections were held, including the five in Wyoming.
Two findings are especially noteworthy: First, only twelve
of the judges (2.9 percent) were not retained in the thirteen
states where trial court judges were up for retention. Second,
an average of 73.4 percent of the voters in these states
favored retaining their judge; the percentages ranged from
a high of 80.0 percent in Kansas (and 79.5 percent in
Wyoming) to a low of 64.1 percent in Alaska. These findings tend to support those critics of merit retention who
argue that the plebiscitory nature of the process inevitably
results in landslide victories for the incumbent judges.
Data for comparisons of voter abstention rates in those
states which held retention elections in 1978 are not available. However, a recent study of judicial retention elections
between 1948 and 1974 found an average abstention rate
of 36 percent.8 Wyoming voters in 1978, in contrast to this
quarter-century average, were much less likely to abstain
on the judicial retention question. But even so, the abstention
by an average of 16.8 percent of Wyoming's voters on
judicial retention was significantly higher than in other
races in the 1978 general election. Only 3.3 percent abstained
7. The 1978 judicial retention election results nationwide, for both trial and
appellate judges, are summarized in Griffin & Horan, Merit Retention
Elections: What Influences the Voters? 63 JUDICATURE 78, 81 (1979).
8. DuBois, supra note 4.
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in the gubernatorial balloting, while eight to ten percent
abstained in the other contests for state office.'
The Wyoming judicial retention results-including the
4 to 1 majority for retention and the 1 to 6 rate of abstentions-raise important questions about the information
available on the record and qualifications of judicial personnel, and how such information relates to the voters'
decisions. If the merit retention election is to serve as the
primary mechanism for public accountability of judges, the
voters must have sufficient information and knowledge
about a judge to make a rational voting choice. In competitive elections, the election campaign plays an important
role in providing information for the voters. Such information, particularly as it arises out of political debate, can be
the basis for a more informed voting decision.
The 1978 judicial retention elections, in contrast to
the statewide races and most local contests, produced no
election campaigns conducted by, for, or against the five
judges standing for retention. No funds were expended by
any of the judges personally, nor were monies spent by
political action groups, according to the Secretary of State's
Elections Office. The Wyoming State Bar, concerned about
the lack of information available to the voters in previous
judicial retention elections, conducted a judicial evaluation
poll in May of 1978. The bar poll results showed that an
average of 80.7 percent of the lawyers who had practiced
before the five judges in the previous year supported their
retention; support ranged from a low of 75.3 percent for
one judge to a near unanimous 98.9 percent for another.1 "
Publication of the bar poll failed to stimulate any
significant discussion of the record and qualifications of
individual judges up for retention. The state bar association released the lawyers' recommendations to the media,
9. K. Griffin & M. Horan, Informational Levels and Voting Behavior: Judicial
Retention Elections in Wyoming 10-13 (paper delivered at the annual
meeting of the Western Social Science Association, Incline Village, Nevada,
April 27, 1979).
10. Based upon information released to the media by the Wyoming State Bar
and published in Wyoming newspapers in October, 1978.
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but did not otherwise engage in any campaign to influence
voters in the upcoming elections. A survey of daily and
weekly newspapers in each county within the five judicial
districts found that the news release was published. However, interviews with the editors of these papers found that
only one wrote an editorial regarding the retention of the
judge in his district.
In summary, the 1978 judicial retention elections in
Wyoming were not only non-competitive and non-partisan,
but non-controversial as well. Interestingly, practicing lawyers who knew the judges gave them a 4 to 1 margin favoring retention, just as the voters did in November. A key
question which emerges from these impressive figures,
however, is this: Given the political context in Wyoming
preceding the retention elections, did those voting have
sufficient knowledge about their judge to make a rational
and informed Voting decision? This question goes to the
heart of the Missouri Plan and public accountability of
judges. It is to this issue which we now turn.
JUDICIAL RETENTION AND INFORMATIONAL

LEVELS

The linkage between the voters' judicial retention decisions and their informational levels was a primary focus
of the 1978 Wyoming Election Year Survey's post-election
interview. No previous surveys, based on our review of the
relevant literature, had studied voting behavior in noncompetitive judicial retention elections. Starting with the
conclusions of other studies which emphasized voter ignorance and apathy, we formulated a series of questions
which sought to determine the voters' perceptions of their
informational levels relative to the judicial conduct and
performance of the five judges up for retention.
The post-election interview was part of a panel study
of 1,020 Wyoming residents. The pre-election survey was
conducted during the three weeks prior to the November
general election; it consisted of a forty-minute personal
interview with respondents who were selected using a
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss2/6
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random clustered method." The pre-election interview included questions on political attitudes and behavior, public
policy issues, and demographic characteristics. The postelection interview, conducted by telephone, asked questions
on voting choices for various statewide races as well as
the judicial retention question. The findings discussed below are based on a sample of 336 voters who lived in the
13 counties where the judicial retention issue was on the
ballot.
The first judicial retention question focused on the
voter's decision to retain the state district court judge.
Each was asked: "Do you recall how you voted on Judge
? Did you vote to keep him in office, did
you vote against him, or don't you recall how you voted?"
The overwhelming majority of those interviewed-as in the
case of the actual vote-voted for retention. However, a
finding of equal interest is that one-fourth of the sample
indicated either that they could not recall how they voted
or volunteered that they abstained on the judicial retention
issue. The sample included 65.6 percent who voted for retention and 10.0 percent who voted against retaining the
judge in their district; however, 18.7 percent could not
remember whether they voted for or against retention,
while the remaining 5.7 percent said they abstained.
After asking how each respondent voted, we turned
to a series of informational questions. First, we asked:
"Overall, how much information did you have about the
record and qualifications of Judge to
serve as a District Court Judge in your county?" Over half
the voters-51.2 percent-reported that they had "no information at all," while 27.6 percent said they had "some"
information and 21.2 percent reported that they had "a
great deal" of information about the judges for whom they
voted.
11. For a discussion of the sampling design and methodology of the survey,
see K. Griffin, Public Policy Issues: The 1978 Wyoming Election Year
Survey (University of Wyoming, Center for Government Research, 1979).
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Second, we asked about the role of the Wyoming State
Bar Poll as an information source in their decision to vote
for or against retention. Before asking whether they had
read or heard about the findings of the bar poll, the respondents were informed that all those lawyers who had practiced before the judge in their district had been asked
whether or not the judge should be kept in office. In response
to the question: "Did you read or hear about the findings
of this poll?", only 12.8 percent reported that they were
aware of the bar poll. A follow-up question found that only
5.1 percent of the sample reported that their retention
decision had been influenced by the lawyers' recommendations.
Finally, we asked the respondents to indicate the
sources of information which were important to them in
deciding how to vote on the judicial retention issue. Personal contacts or observations of the judge was the single
most frequently cited source of information; this was noted
by 32.7 percent of the sample. The second-ranked source
of information-conversations with friends or acquaintances-was cited by 22.0 percent, while 17.3 percent indicated that the media-newspapers, radio, televisionwere important sources of information in their decision.
In summary, two profiles of the Wyoming voter confronted with a judicial retention decision emerge from these
findings. The first profile is characterized by the person
who has no information on the judge, his record or qualifications for sitting on the bench. For this "uninformed"
voter, we assume that the retention question has little or
no importance for his or her political life. The second profile is characterized by the person who perceives that he or
she has at least some minimal level of information about
the judge and his qualifications and, presumably, the judicial retention issue has some salience. Among these "informed" voters, 48.6 percent reported that their knowledge
was based on a single source of information, while 40.6
percent relied on two sources and only 10.8 percent utilized
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss2/6
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three sources of information in making their decision on
judicial retention.
INFORMATIONAL INFLUENCES ON VOTING

The preceding analysis suggests that, when confronted
with a judicial retention decision, Wyoming voters can be
characterized on two significant dimensions. First, when
asked about their voting choices, they reported that they
(1) made a decision and remembered whether the choice
was "yes" or "no," or (2) decided not to decide and "abstained" or (3) remembered voting but could not recall
whether they opted for or against retention. Second, when
asked about information sources, the voters were rather
evenly split between the "uninformed" who had no information on the record and qualifications of the candidate,
and the "informed" voter who reportedly had received at
least some minimal level of information.
Do informational levels influence the judicial retention decisions made by voters? As Table 2 shows, our survey of Wyoming voters supports the conclusion that judicial
retention choices are made in large measure without regard
to information sources. Focusing on those in the sample
who clearly recalled voting either "yes" or "no" on retention,
we found that information about the judge's record and
qualifications for office, as well as whether the voters had
heard of the bar poll, had personal contact with the judge,
had talked with friends about the judge, or had media
information, did not significantly influence the voters'
choice. However, when the above three sources of information were summed into a judicial information index, we
found that a slight difference emerged. Those reporting
two or three sources of information were the least likely
to vote for retention of their judge, while those with only
one source were the most likely to vote for retention.
The conclusion that information is not related to voting
"'yes" or "no" on judicial retention is based on only a part
of our sample, however; it does not include those who said
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 2, Art. 6

578

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

they "abstained" or could not remember how they voted,
if indeed they did. When these individuals are included in
the analysis, as also shown in Table 2, information levels
were found to be significantly related to the voters' recollections of their decision. What this analysis suggests is that
the uninformed are the "abstainers" and the "forgetters,"
while the informed are the voters.
Interestingly, only one source of information on the
retention question differentiates the uninformed from the
informed. For example, only 2.7 percent of those who reported having any information on the record and qualifications of the judge either abstained or could not remember
how they voted, but 45.1 percent of those who said they
had no information about the judge abstained or could not
remember. Even having heard of the Wyoming State Bar
Poll made a difference; only 1.6 percent of those who had
heard about the lawyers' recommendations either abstained
or forgot, compared to 27.8 percent of those who had not
heard of it.
The importance of the three sources of information
about which the voters were asked is also linked to their
recollections, though, as noted above, not their voting choice.
Only 0.6 percent of those who had personal contacts with
the judge abstained or could not remember how they voted
on judicial retention, compared to 35.9 percent who did not
have such contacts. Among those influenced by friends, 2.2
percent abstained or forgot, compared to 31.0 percent for
those without such influences. Finally, of those who cited
the media as an informational source which influenced their
retention decision, only 1.2 percent abstained or could not
recall, while 29.3 percent of the "no-media" group abstained
or forgot.
To further examine the effects of information sources
on judicial retention decisions, we combined the three
sources-personal contacts, conversations with friends and
the media-into an informational index again. The effects
of increasing informational levels are clear. First, among
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss2/6
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those with none of these informational sources, one-third
could not recall how or even if they voted. Second, of the
150 voters in the sample with one or more sources of information, only one abstained and one forgot what his or her
decision was.
In summary, two major findings emerged from the
above analysis of Wyoming voters. First, the evidence is so
convincing that we must conclude that information sources
had little, if any, influence upon the voters' judicial retention decisions. The informational variables included in our
1978 survey do not explain why some voters, in fact, the
overwhelming majority, voted "yes" on judicial retention,
while others voted "no." Second, we found that voters who
had information about judges standing for retention are
more likely to recall how they voted on the judicial retention
question. Furthermore, a single source of information raises
the judicial retention issue out of the realm of ignorance
and apathy. While voters may not be especially well-informed, the fact that those with even one source of information can remember voting either "yes" or "no" on retention has profound implications for the problem of voter
apathy in merit retention elections.
DISCUSSION AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES

The public is rarely in a position to know in advance how good a judicial candidate is, but if his
record as a judge is outstandingly poor, the voters
can ascertain the facts, and in the merit retention
elections they have a means of removing him. 2
But How Do They Ascertain the Facts?
In one sense, the behavior of Wyoming voters in the
1978 judicial retention elections enables the proponents of
merit retention to assert that it is functioning just as it
was intended to function. Political partisanship, personalities and electioneering played no visible role in the voting;
the Wyoming State Bar fulfilled its obligation to advise the
12. Winters & Allard, supra note 3, at 164.
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electorate concerning its support or non-support of the
judges running for retention; and finally, all five of the
candidates were retained in office by popular majorities
which were not only overwhelming, but also in rough proportion to the support the judges had garnered from the
state bar poll.
On a deeper level, however, there is surely cause for
disappointment and concern. Satisfaction with the outcomes
of the 1978 judicial retention elections should not be permitted to obscure the troublesome features of the overall
process by which these fortuitous results were obtained.
While likely not unique to Wyoming, this process was
permeated with voter lack of information about the candidates and by a sizeable proportion (about one out of six)
of the electorate who failed to vote on the question of
retention. In a low-populated state where politicians emphasize the informality of first names and voters typically
know or have met elected officials, half the people voting
admitted they knew nothing about the record and qualifications of the judge on whom they had been asked to pass
judgment upon. Even more importantly, informational
sources and levels seemed to make no difference in their
decision to support or oppose the retention of their judgea decision supposedly based upon "merit." Of course, abstention and lack of information are not confined to popular
election of candidates for the bench; they have been noted
as matters of increasingly serious concern on all levels
of the governmental spectrum, legislative and executive,
as well as federal, state and local. Yet, it seems likely that
those very conditions which are perceived as the virtues of
merit retention of judges-the exclusion of political parties
(the feature of nonpartisanship) and the absence of the
clash of personalities (the noncompetitive feature)-also
exacerbate the problems of voter knowledge and participation. Without the stimuli of party labels and candidate
competition, and in an atmosphere where fear of politicizing
the courts places severe informal restraints on the public
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debate of judicial "issues,"18 many voters see merit retention elections as devoid of any real significance.' Although
merit retention under these conditions, both in Wyoming 5
and elsewhere has long operated to the decided advantage
of incumbent judges, another consequence has been to lend
strong credence to those who charge that the process is
nothing but window-dressing, a facade for maintaining
popular accountability of judicial officers by means of a
plebiscite whose favorable outcome is assured in advance.'"
While this means that good judges are more or less routinely
kept in office, so are the mediocre and even poor ones.
Indeed, the pro-incumbent tendencies of merit retention
are so formidable that in some jurisdictions opposition by
the bar and the press has failed to prevent judges from
rolling up heavy majorities for retention in office. 7
Reactions in the legal community to the disappointing
aspects of merit retention plans in operation have followed
divergent paths. Probably the most frequently traveled one
has been in the direction of strengthening the perceived
weak points in the merit retention process, including better
bar poll procedures and stimulating public awareness of
the personnel and activities of the judicial branch of government. On the other hand, disillusionment with merit
retention has led more pessimistic observers to call for the
abandonment of the plan and a shifting toward more adequate institutional safeguards for dealing with individuals
who transgress the bounds of judicial propriety.
In which direction should Wyoming move? While any
response will undoubtedly be colored by one's philosophical
position and value-orientation in matters connected with
the judiciary, it would seem reasonable to be guided not
only by a prudent awareness of what is at any one time
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Ladinsky & Silver, Popular Democracy and Judicial Independence: Electorate and Elite Reactions to Two Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections,
1967 Wis. L. REv. 128.
See Dubois, supra note 4; Dubois, The Significance of Voting Cues in
State Supreme Court Elections, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 757 (1979).
Out of the total of 22 merit retention elections held in Wyoming since
1972, only one judge has been turned out of office by the voters.
Wormuth & Rich, supra note 5.
See Griffin & Horan supra note 7, at 82-83, and the sources cited therein.
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practicably attainable, but also by a consideration for fundamental principles of the political community in which
we live. In this light, it would also seem reasonable that
in a democratic society we determine whether a form of
popular election of important public officials which is not
working as expected can first be reformed, before we consider dismantling it altogether. Efforts should be made to
cure the patient before pronouncing him dead. If the political
doctrine of popular accountability, which, after all, is the
principal justification for requiring any public official to
run on an election ballot in any way, really does mean that
the people should have some direct voice in who shall staff
their courts, then attempts should be launched to correct
the defects of merit retention; and only if these prove
unworkable or otherwise practicably insoluble, should more
radical measures be considered. The forms of corrective
action for the deficiencies of merit retention in Wyoming
may at first glance seem novel, but fortunately they are
not without precedent in other states. As with so many
other community problems, the greatest opportunities, as
well as responsibilities, fall on the shoulders of the bar and
the press.
Possible Bar Poll Reforms
Up to now, studies have demonstrated that the standard practice of polling members of the bar about a candidate running for retention, and then simply furnishing
a raw tabulation of the overall results to the newspapers
for publication and the presumed edification of the voters,
is inadequate as a means of "informing" the public about
the qualifications and record of a judge. This procedure,
which has been followed in large measure by the Wyoming
State Bar for judicial retention elections since 1976,18
clearly did not reach a very large proportion of the electorate
in 1978, and evidently had limited effect upon those it did
18. While the 1978 state bar poll in Wyoming happily went beyond the strawpoll variety in order to gauge respondent attitudes concerning specific
criteria applicable to a judge's performance, the practice of the bar has
been to release to the public only the summary data from responses to
the ultimate question concerning- whether the subject of the evaluation
should or should not be retained in office.
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reach.' While the concept of providing the lay public with
a considered evaluation of a judge's professional qualifications by those of his colleagues who come into contact with
him in their work offers, in theory, a valuable informational
guideline for enabling the voters to make a more intelligent
decision on whether to retain officials with a comparatively
low degree of visibility in the public eye, s" the tool by which
this evaluation is gathered must be carefully designed. If
all of the lawyers in a retention candidate's jurisdiction
are to be surveyed, stringent controls must be employed to
(1) assure that the resulting evaluation is based upon the
responses of only those who have first-hand knowledge about
a judge's performance in office, and (2) dispel the suspicion
that a negative evaluation will somehow lay the respondent
open to retaliation, by guaranteeing to the maximum feasible extent that all respondents will remain anonymous.
The survey instrument, whether personal interview or mail
questionnaire, should go beyond the simple "Do you think
Judge X should be retained in office. Yes or No?" type of
question so characteristic of straw polls, and seek to elicit
the grounds for this ultimate answer, based upon specific
criteria related to a judge's performance in office.2 ' An
analysis of the resulting data, with percentage figures,
should be submitted to the press after being shown to the
candidate himself for inspection and comment. The press'
cooperation in publishing a full summary of the results
19. See pp. 576-579 supra.
20. To be sure, influencing the electorate is only one of the purposes served
by bar polls. Another, sometimes overlooked, use of these devices is to
encourage self-improvement by judges by providing them with evaluative
feedback from the bar even when a retention election is not imminent.
The Wyoming State Bar in 1978 polled its members concerning all of the
district and supreme court judges in the state with this end in mind.
Unfortunately, the limited amount of data from the poll that was released
to the public pertained only to the five judges running for retention that
year. As a leading study of bar polls in the United States has indicated,
however: "To maximize the influence of a judicial performance poll, full
public disclosure is required. Even if self-improvement by the judiciary
is the major goal, public awareness of the poll results should provide a
stronger impetus for change." D. MADDI, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE POLLs 22
(Research Contributions of the American Bar Foundation No. 1, 1977). See
also C. PHILIP, How BAR ASSOCIATIONS EVALUATE SITTING JUDGES 14-20
(1976). But see Douglas, Could Jurors Reach a Verdict on Judges, Too?
62 JUDICATURE 57 (1978). Bar poll data on all judges could prove valuable
background information for the work of the Wyoming Judicial Supervisory
Commission as well. See generally pp. 589-591 infra.
21. PHILIP, supra note 20; MADDI supra note 20, at 1.
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should be enlisted, in order to avoid distortions or misunderstandings in the minds of the public.2 2
The role of the organized bar in judicial retention
elections need not conclude at this point. Bar assistance to
approved candidates, in the form of explicit endorsements
in the media, and, in some circumstances, even financial
assistance (e.g., for publicity purposes), should be seriously
considered."3
There is also no reason why others besides lawyers
who have had the opportunity to observe a judge in action
could not comment intelligibly about his demeanor on the
bench. Alaska has found it worthwhile to poll all of the
jurors who have served in a retention candidate's courtroom during his term, as well as law enforcement officers
in the state. The results are disseminated to the public
prior to the retention balloting.2 ' Designed with care to
assure the reliability of the results, such surveys can provide different informational perspectives to the electorate
than the traditional bar poll, which is sometimes regarded
by segments of the general public as smacking of elitism.
Further input could be obtained through trained monitoring
of court proceedings by concerned civic groups, such as the
court watching project undertaken by the Illinois League
of Women Voters in 1975.2" Programs of this kind were
established by private organizations in a number of states
during the 1970's and, while sometimes accused of axegrinding, have helped to contribute information about judges
22. For an account of a recent bar poll and newspaper effort to convey
reliable and meaningful information to the electorate prior to voting on
retention of judges, see the articles in the Denver Post on Oct. 1, 1978
(pp. 2, 50) ; Oct. 8, 1978 (p. 2) ; Oct. 29, 1978 (pp. 58-60).
23. See generally Meidinger, Bar Polls: What They Measure, What They Miss,
60 JUDICATURE 469, 473 (1977); Hyde, The Missouri Plan for Selection and
Retention of Judges, 9 F.R.D. 457, 462 (1950).
24. Rubenstein, Alaska's Judicial Evaluation Program: A Poll the Voters Rejected, 60 JUDICATURE 478 (1977). By law, the Alaska Judicial Council
(the judicial nominating agency under Alaska's plan of merit selection of
judges) is required to evaluate judges running for retention and disseminate
this evaluation to the public prior to the election. If it wishes, the Council
may even recommend to the public whether it should vote yes or no on
any particular candidate. ALASKA STAT. §22.10.150 (1976).
25. See New York Times, Feb. 24, 1977, at 18.
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to the voting public.2 6
The Role of the Press and Other Mass Media
The press has a vital role in this process of informing
the public, of course. In addition to serving as a vehicle
for the transmission of the views of the bar and other
interested groups, it has the duty as well as the right to
provide voters with evaluations of its own concerning judges
whose names appear on the retention ballot. The complexities
of legal procedure and the "cult of the robe" ought not to
be permitted to immunize the occupants of the judicial
branch of government from the scrutiny given other public
officials. A somewhat cynical (but possibly true) observation has it that in order for a judge to be removed from
office in a retention vote, he would have to commit a crime
or a flagrant moral offense. 7 But is grave scandal the only
touchstone of unfitness to hold judicial office which the
electorate may take cognizance of? Surely not. Certainly
other kinds of misbehavior or personal deficiencies, such as
chronic neglect of duty, laziness, intemperance, and arbitrariness by judges are also deserving of censure; and these
ought to be apparent to news reporters, not just lawyersassuming, of course, the news media recognize an obligation
to cover the courts and keep the public informed about their
judges.
To be sure, the court-reporting capabilities of any news
organization are limited by the constraints of time, staff
resources, the nature of the medium, and the technical
complexity of the subject itself. What coverage the New
York Times and the Washington Post give to the law in
their pages is not a practical yardstick for the coverage by
the Casper Star-Tribune or the average small-town daily
26. Stecich, Keeping an Eye on the Courts: A Survey of Court Observer Programs, 58 JUDICATURE 468, 472 (1975); Nejelski, Judging in a Democracy:
The Tension of Popular Participation,61 JUDICATURE 166 (1977). See also
Winsor & Dunn, Keeping an Eye on the Courts in Massachusetts, 57
JUDICATURE 111 (1973) ; Weinstein & Zimmerman, Let the People Observe
Their Courts, 61 JUDICATURE 156 (1977).
27. See Jenkins, Retention Elections: Who Wins When No One Loses? 61
JUDICATURE 79 (1977).
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in Wyoming. However, while wire service (United Press
International) and local newspaper reporting about the
activities of the judicial branch of state government has
made noticeable improvements in the past decade, most
news stories still consist of either lists of court appearances
and dispositions, or event-centered items (such as controversial criminal trials or important decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court). The latter of these especially characterizes court news broadcast by radio and television stations within the state. On the other hand, in-depth analyses
of the decision-making tendencies of particular tribunals
or judges are relatively uncommon, as are items localizing
national or state legal news stories.2" Perhaps most fundamental of all here is the need to educate the public concerning the contemporary significance of the courts in the
making of public policy. In a society accustomed to thinking
of the courts as refereeing essentially private disputes according to pre-established norms of law, it is important to recognize the judicial function in helping to create those norms.2"
Newspapers analyses and television documentaries frequently bear witness to the role of the United States
Supreme Court in this regard, but sadly neglect the less
glamorous state and local courts. This, despite the increasing tendency for interest groups denied succor in the
federal courts to achieve recognition of their claims by
recourse to state tribunals and provisions of state constitutions." The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision last
January ordering approximate equalization of funding for
school districts in the state illustrates this trend,"1 and is
28. See generally Drechsel, How Minnesota Newspapers Cover the Trial Courts,
62 JUDICATURE 195 (1978). See also Burch, An Editor Looks at Judicial
Selection, 44 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 142 (1960); Grey, Covering the Courts:
Problems of Specialization, 26 NIEMAN REP. 17 (1972).

29. Indeed, one study of the Wisconsin electorate found that the mass media,
through the vehicles of television courtroom dramas and news stories about
the courts, had little impact on people's perception of the courts. Attentiveness to the courts was for most people neither a way of becoming more
informed about them nor a means of selectively reinforcing previouslyheld views about them; it was, rather, an anticipated source of entertainment. Jacob, supra note 3, at 816-18.
30. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HAiv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
31. Compare Washakie County School District No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d
310 (Wyo. 1980) with San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1978).
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but one of several cases"2 which suggest that the judiciary
in Wyoming is taking a more active role in policy-making
than it has in the past. If public policy ultimately rests
upon informed popular consent, it should not be regarded
as a threat to the integrity of the judiciary for the news
media to undertake to explain how and why appellate courts
make policy, what its content in a particular area appears
to be, and where particular judges stand on it. Likewise,
on the trial level, judicial behavior in such matters as
sentencing practices and the efficient disposition of cases
are of general concern to the public, and might well play
an important part in the electorate's decision whether to
retain a judge. 3 Journalists who possess some background
in legal subjects by no means require a law degree to write
intelligently about these activities of appellate and trial
courts; but unless much more is done to stimulate public
interest and concern for such matters, it can safely be
predicted that voter concern for who staffs their courts
will remain at disappointingly low levels.
The Alternative: Abolition of Merit Retention and Reliance
Upon Judicial Disciplinary Provisions
Disillusionment with voting behavior in merit retention
elections has led some observers to so doubt their effectiveness as a means of eliminating unfit judges, as to suggest
that they should be discarded altogether in favor of some
more reliable means to this end. Thus, while the initial
selection provisions of the Missouri Plan (i.e. merit selection) would continue with executive appointment of judges
from names submitted by mixed panels of lawyers and
knowledgeable laymen, proposals have been made to strengthen the likelihood of obtaining well-qualified judges by
32. See, e.g., Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners, 575 P. 2d 1155 (1978);
Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority,
575 P. 2d 1100 (1978).
38. Such information-though perhaps in a more generalized form-is, of
course, well known to the attorneys who practice in a particular court.
In the absence of a computerized data collection system, however, public
awareness of this kind of information may have to depend upon a news
reporter inquiring enough to extract it from a mass of accumulated data
in a clerk of court's files. For an account of the controversy stirred up
by a recent proposal in California to require the computerized collection
of data relating to judicial disposition of criminal cases in the courts of
that state, see Berg & Flynn, Independence v. Accountability: California's
Tug of War, 59 JUDICATURE 379 (1976).
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broadening the basis of representation on the nominating
panels, 4 requiring the executive's choice to receive legislative confirmation,"5 or otherwise improving the initial recruitment process for filling vacancies on the bench.s"
Merit retention would thus be shored up or perhaps even
dropped altogether in favor of tenure "during good behavior." 7 The structural details of such proposals vary,
but nearly all share the common feature of reliance upon
effective procedures for disciplining or removing judges
specifically found unfit to serve. Pioneered by California
in 1960, 48 states during the past two decades have supplemented their traditional methods of removing judges (typically the impeachment process) by creating special judicial
conduct commissions possessing legal authority to deal with
allegations of judicial unfitness. 8 In Wyoming, this agency
is the Judicial Supervisory Commission, created by constitutional amendment in 1972." Made up of two district court
judges, two members of the Wyoming State Bar, and three
laymen, this body receives complaints submitted to it concerning judicial misbehavior. If investigation and hearing
show good cause, the Judicial Supervisory Commission can
recommend to the state supreme court that it retire, censure,
or remove a judge from office because of (1) seriously
incapacitating disability, (2) willful misconduct in office,
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform one's duties,
(4) habitual intemperance, or (5) conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice that brings the judicial office
into disrepute. " Sanctions for these indications of unfitness
can be imposed only by the supreme court itself. 1
34. Dunn, Judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study with Proposals
for Reform, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 267 (1976).
35. Id.; Spaeth, Reflections on a Judicial Campaign, 60 JUDICATURE 10 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 24.
37. Dunn, supra note 34; Spaeth, supra note 35; Nelson, Variations on a
Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S.CAL. L. REV. 4 (1962).
38. See I. TESITOR, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS (1978). The entire
November, 1979, issue of JUDICATURE is devoted to a discussion of various
aspects of these commissions.
39. WYO. CONST. art. 5, §6.
40. WYO. CONST. art. 5, §6(e).
41. Removal is mandatory if a judge is convicted of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, and the conviction becomes final. Wyo. CONST.
art. 5, §6(d).
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While a detailed study of the Wyoming Judicial Supervisory Commission is obviously beyond the scope of this
article, it may be observed here that the commission presently
operates under budgetary and legal restraints which severely
inhibit its presumed function of holding judges accountable
to the public for their misconduct. Like similar agencies in
many other states, it has no permanent investigative staff
of its own, depending instead upon commission members or
ad hoc "examiners" to initially review complaints, conduct
preliminary investigations, and present evidence at formal
hearings. 2 Proceedings before the commission are governed
by strict rules of secrecy until the point at which it files
a disciplinary recommendation with the supreme court;4"
dismissal of a complaint as "trivial," or an adjudication
favorable to the judge is thus never made part of the public
record. This, to be sure, serves to protect the reputation of
the judge involved in the complaint, but it is hardly reassuring to a public increasingly skeptical of all governmental officials in this post-Watergate era. The Judicial
Supervisory Commission files no annual public reports by
which its activities can be evaluated, nor does it conduct
any significant educational program by which the public
could be made aware of its existence as well as what avenues
of recourse the commission offers to those having a legitimate grievance against a judge.4 Finally, the grounds for
which the commission may recommend disciplinary measures
do not extend to judges who are merely incompetent, even
though knowledge of the law and the judicial functions
thereunder- are among the minimal qualifications for judicial fitness.4" These perceived weaknesses in the potential
42.. See generally Devroy, A Reporter's Notes on the Boston Conference, 63
JUDICATURE 249 (1979). The Wyoming Judicial Supervisory Commission's
.budget for. the fiscal biennium ending June 30, 1980 was $5,958. 1978
WYo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 12, §86.
43. A breach of the secrecy rule is punishable as: contempt of court. WYo. JUD.
SUPERV. COMM'N-R. 7 (a).

44. See generally Martineau, The Educational Role of Judicial Conduct Orga. nizations, 63 JUDICATURE 227 (1979).
45. Nor, it should be pointed out, do the grounds for disciplinary action by
any judicial conduct organization in the United States-extend to judges
merely because their decisions-in the absence of fraud,, corrupt motive,
or bad faith-are unpopular. Whether the electorate ought to refrain from
punishing judges by failing to retain them' on account of their decisions,
is a question' which goes to the heart of the meaning of "popular accountability," and obviously raises the problem of how it is to be balanced
with the competing value of judicial independence.
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effectiveness of the Judicial Supervisory Commission are
again not unique to Wyoming, but they do make highly
debatable whether the disciplinary commission concept-at
least in its present form-can serve as a fully satisfactory
substitute for the removal potentialities of the merit retention election.
Thus, while the spread of judicial conduct organizations
has helped to provide the impetus for a tempering in reform
enthusiasm for the merit retention idea,4" no jurisdiction
has yet actually gone so far as to eliminate the step from
its process of choosing and retaining judges. For the time
being, merit retention and the judicial disciplinary commission concept seem to be regarded as complementary
approaches to the same intractable problem: How to deal
with judges whose conduct must be called into account by
the community, while at the same time preserving the
essential independence of the judicial branch of government.
Failure to significantly improve the informational weaknesses associated with merit retention can only lead to
further doubts about its usefulness; on the other hand, those
who advocate reliance upon the disciplinary commission
concept have yet to demonstrate that its secrecy from public
view, limited grounds for sanctions, and other debilitating
characteristics, will nevertheless enable it to function compatibly with the maintenance of public confidence in a fair,
upright, and competent judiciary.

46. The American Bar Association reaffirmed its endorsement of merit
selection and retention of judges in 1974, but added, as an alternative
to merit retention, appointment of judges during good behavior, or until
reaching the age of compulsory retirement. See ABA Strongly Reaffirms
Merit Plan Endorsement, 57 JUDICATURE 370 (1974). See also Ellis, Court
Reform in New York State: An Overview for 1975, 3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 663,
674-75, 679 (1975).
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